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ESSAYS
ATTORNEYS QUA SPORTS AGENTS: AN
ETHICAL CONUNDRUM
WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR.*
1. INTRODUCTION
Sports agents used to be outlaws; hairdressers were more regulated
than sports agents. Today, however, more than half of the United States
attempts to regulate agents in one manner or another.' Likewise, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)2 and various sports
unions3 have also attempted to control the agent-athlete relationship.4
There is also a brief common law tradition that demands that an
agent must negotiate in good faith 5 and articulate all potential conflicts
of interest.6 Yet, there is no all-encompassing regulatory board that acts
* The author is a professor at Texas Southern University Law School, Houston, Texas.
He holds a B.A. degree from St. Joseph's University, an M.A. degree from Western Illinois
University, an M.S. degree from Drexel University, and a J.D. from Temple University. He is
the author of Fundamentals of Sports Law and Sports Law in a Nutshell.
1. See generally The Beat Goes On in Athlete Agent Regulation, 14 THE SPORTS LAWYER 1
(1996). "With more than half of all U.S. states already regulating athlete agents, new bills are
being considered in state legislatures throughout the country that would regulate the business
of sports agency. At least 15 of the states that regulate athlete agents - Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Car-
olina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington - require that an athlete agent regis-
ter with the state and pay a registration fee. Florida law also requires that an athlete agent
pass an examination on the law and rules concerning athlete agency as a prerequisite to being
licensed to practice as an athlete agent." See also SLA Spearheads Effort to Make State Agent
Regulations Uniform, 14 THE SPORTS LAWYER 1 (1996).
2. See generally Jan Stiglitz, NCAA-Based Agent Regulation: Who Are We Protecting? 67
N. D. L. REv. 215 (1991).
3. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 416 (1990).
4. See generally Kenneth Shropshire, Athlete Agent Regulation: Proposed Legislative Re-
visions, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 85 (1988); Ed Garvey and Frank J. Remington, Univer-
sities, Student-Athletes and Sports Agents: Is It Time for a Change?, 67 N. D. L. REv. 197
(1991); W. Jack Grosse and Eric Warren, The Regulation, Control, and Protection of Athlete
Agents, 19 N. Ky. L. REv. 49 (1991); and Alec Powers, The Need to Regulate Sports Agents, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 253 (1994).
5. Zinn v. Parrish, 461 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Il. 1977), rev'd without op., 582 F.2d 128 (7th
Cir. 1977), appeal after removal, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1987).
6. Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd in part without
op. & remanded in part without op., 767 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1984).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
as an omniscient watch dog.7 Therefore, the intrepid would-be agent can
still act the fool almost with impunity.8 In other words, there are serious
gaps in the so-called regulation of sports agents - sufficient gaps that
the "Arliss-like" non-attorney agent can easily manipulate the inconsis-
tencies to the disadvantage of his or her often hapless clients. "To be or
not to be - that is the question, whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea
of troubles, and by opposing end them?" 9 Is it nobler, to act as an attor-
ney qua agent and risk onerous sanctions, or merely to be an ordinary
Joe (or Jane) qua agent and, thus, avoid a sea of troubles. Because the
field is not truly defined or fully developed yet, an attorney is subject to
more rules and regulations under the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity than a non-attorney agent. This is true even though the attorney qua
agent usually deals in matters that are more agent-oriented than legally-
oriented. 10
II. BACKGROUND
Agents are paid to represent professional athletes. This representa-
tion, at a minimum, includes the negotiation of an employment contract
between the player and the team. Agents and athletes have a fiduciary
relationship; therefore, agents must exercise the utmost degree of good
7. See generally Lawrence D. Dunn, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since It Hasn't Suc-
ceeded, Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTiNGS L.J. 1031 (1988).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993): "Walters offered
cars and money to those who would agree to use him as their representative in dealing with
professional teams. Sports agents receive a percentage of the players' income, so Walters
would profit only to the extent he could negotiate contracts for his clients. The athletes' pro
prospects depended on successful completion of their collegiate careers. To the NCAA, how-
ever, a student who signs a contract with an agent is a professional, ineligible to play on col-
legiate teams. To avoid jeopardizing his clients' careers, Walters dated the contracts after the
end of their eligibility and locked them in a safe. He promised to lie to the Universities in
response to any inquiries." Id.
9. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc.1, line 56 in COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKE-
SPEARE (1971) (Alexander text).
10. See generally Paul T. Dee, Ethical Aspects of Representing Professional Athletes, 3
MARO. SPORTS L.J. 111 (1992); Daniel L. Shneidman, The Second Annual Sports Dollars &
Sense Conference: A Symposium on Sports Industry Contracts and Negotiations: Selected Is-
sues of Client Representation by "Sports" Lawyers Under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 4 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 129 (1993) (it is his view that the relationship between an attorney-
agent and his or her client does indeed fall within the traditional Model Rules); and George
Cohen, The Second Annual Sports Dollars & Sense Conference: A Symposium on Sports In-
dustry Contracts and Negotiations: Ethics and the Representation of Professional Athletes, 4
MARO. SPORTS L.J. 149 (1993).
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faith, honesty and loyalty toward their athletes." The key to the player-
agent relationship is the standard representation contract. Like the stan-
dard player's contract between the player and the team, the standard
representation contract establishes the rights and responsibilities be-
tween player and agent. A representation contract only calls for a good
faith effort on the part of the agent; the agent's efforts do not necessarily
have to be successful. 2 But the agent does have the obligation to make
a full disclosure of possible conflicting commitments, and must receive
prior consent from all potential conflicting interests.' 3 For example, in
the recent case of In re Henley, 4 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
an attorney/agent must fully disclose any financial interest and can only
receive compensation for services from another upon the client's con-
sent, after full disclosure.
The responsibilities of the agent will usually include contract negotia-
tion, investments, taxes and public relations. The representation con-
tract typically stipulates that the agent will be the athlete's exclusive
representative. The fees for these services vary, dependant on the re-
sponsibilities and the sport. However, the various unions for the major
team sports have thrust themselves into the agent-athlete relationship by
limiting fees and ordaining registration as a prerequisite to representa-
tion. On the other hand, the athlete should expect that the results are
comparable to the results of other agents. The agent has an affirmative
duty to be aware of the customs and practices in professional sports. In
regard to publicity, the agent must use his or her best efforts in a good
faith attempt to find contracts off of the playing field. An agent's basic
responsibilities are to exercise good faith efforts overall and to act as a
trustee for investing the clients' money, including investing in such secur-
ities and business ventures as a prudent investor would for his or her
own account, having in view both safety and income in light of the ath-
lete's means and purposes.15
There are many functions that an agent can provide for the athlete.
These functions might include: contract negotiations, tax planning, fi-
ll. See CHAMPION, supra note 3, at 410. See generally Giulietti, Agents of Professional
Athletes, 15 NEw ENG. L. RPv. 545 (1980); and Faber, The Evolution of Techniques for Negoti-
ation of Sports Employment Contracts in the Era of the Agent, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L.
RFv. 165 (1993).
12. See Zinn, 461 F.Supp. at 11. See generally CHAMPION, supra note 3, at 410.
13. See Detroit Lions, Inc., 580 F.Supp. at 542. See generally CHAMPION, supra note 3, at
410-11.
14. 267 Ga. 366, 478 S.E.2d 134 (1996).
15. CHAMPION, supra note 3, at 411-12.
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nancial planning, money management, investments, estate planning, in-
come tax preparation, incorporating the client, endorsements, sports
medicine consultations, physical health consultations, post-career devel-
opment, career and personal development counseling, legal consulta-
tions and insurance matters. Regarding money management, the
measure of success for an agent should be the athlete's financial security
at retirement. In short, the agent must accomplish the following steps:
contract negotiation, including tax planning; medical needs assessment;
post-career planning, including job evaluations, short-term monthly
budgets and long-term financial planning; off-the-field opportunities, in-
cluding endorsements, commercials, developing musical or broadcasting
talents, educational and job counseling, and personal appearances; and
self-improvement plans, including, if necessary, drug and alcohol coun-
seling, continued educational or career preparation, speech and acting
lessons, and advice relating to grooming, relationships with the media
and improved self-image and confidence. 16
The two preeminent cases that define the relationship between agent
and athlete are Zinn v. Parrish'7 and Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz.'8 In
Zinn, a football player entered into a professional management agree-
ment. His agent was to negotiate contracts, furnish advice on business
and tax matters, seek endorsements and assist with off-season employ-
ment. The agent performed some of these obligations; he solicited some
investment advice from others and forwarded it to the athlete, and as-
sisted him in investing $1200 to buy a house, but did not assist the athlete
with jobs, substantial endorsements or off-season employment. Regard-
ing taxes, the athlete was sent to H&R Block. The football player termi-
nated the arrangement, and the agent sued to recover his fees due under
the agreement. The athlete argued that the agent functioned as an in-
vestment advisor under 15 U.S.C. § 80(b) - 2(a)(11). Thus, because the
agent was not registered, the contract was void. The court, however,
found that the investment advice was merely incidental to the main pur-
pose of the management contract. Furthermore, the court held that an
agent will satisfy her obligations simply by performing her duties in good
faith.
16. See id. at 413, 415. See generally Etter, Representing the Professional Athlete, 37
WASH. ST. B. NEWS 12 (1983); and Faber, supra note 11, at 165.
17. 461 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. III. 1977); rev'd without op., 582 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1977), appeal
after removal, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1987).
18. 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd in part without op. & remanded in part with-
out op., 767 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1984).
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In Argovitz, a football player was coerced by his agent, a dentist, to
break his NFL contract and join a USFL team. His agent was also a co-
owner of the aforementioned USFL team. The court held that there
were several breaches of the agent's fiduciary duty to his client, and en-
tered an order rescinding the second contract. The court further held
that the fact that the player knew that his agent had an interest in the
team was immaterial, since the agent had an obligation to inform the
principal of all facts that he was aware of that might affect his principal's
rights or interests, or influence the actions that he decided to take. 19
III. AN ATrORNEY'S ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: TWENTY-FOUR
AND SEVEN
It has often been said that an attorney is an attorney twenty-four
hours a day and that he or she is always under oath. But the conundrum
here is whether it is fair or even a violation of Equal Protection to treat
non-attorney agents one way and attorney-agents another way. Current
common law holds that an agent does not need any particular training or
experiences to act as a sports agent; he or she could be a high school
drop-out or a social misfit, a Rhodes scholar or a law professor.2 °
Another writer who also reviewed the nexus between attorney-
agents and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, saw the problem
this way:
In part, because of these rules, agents and attorneys representing
clients in the sports field are no different than the attorneys who
represent actors or actresses, corporate executives, factory work-
ers, or an unemployed person. An attorney's obligation under
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not differ regardless
of the industry or the client with whom you serve. However,
some of the factual situations do require different substantive
knowledge and discretion. I will not accept, nor do I agree with
the statement that the relationship between an agent and his or
her client does not fall within the traditional Model Rules. That
type of statement lends itself to the artificial creation of differ-
ences between lawyers and a belief that if there is a proscription
[sic] in the Model Rules, it does not apply to all of those in the
legal field.2
19. See generally Zinn, 461 F. Supp. at 11 and Detroit Lions, Inc., 580 F. Supp. at 542.
20. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 389 (7th Cir. 1990). "Norby Walters, a former
nightclub owner, and Lloyd Bloom, a 25-year-old, self-described salesman, together formed
World Sports & Entertainment (WS&E) in August 1984." Id
21. Schneidman, supra note 10, at 129. "The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are
essentially based upon what the American Bar Association (ABA) has laid out. These rules
1997]
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Yet, the question still remains: when there is a problem, is it an agent
regulation concern, an attorney-discipline matter, or some hybrid kind of
situation? In addition, if the problems of the attorney-agent fall
squarely into attorney discipline jurisdictions, can the general prohibi-
tions of the Model Rules do real justice in policing the particular
problems that occur in the sporting milieu?
Another writer has stated:
The profession of sports agency is not as old, nor is its code of
conduct as well defined. At first, one might suggest that at pres-
ent there is no ethical code or system which governs agent con-
duct. However, it is submitted that agent conduct is regulated,
even though there is not an organized profession or specialized
code of conduct.2 2
If there isn't an organized code per se, should sports agents borrow an
already existing code of ethical conduct, and if so, which one?
Another writer explains:
Many sports agents are professionals licensed to practice in their
particular jurisdiction. While the profession that must immedi-
ately come to mind is the legal profession, many agents are certi-
fied public accountants, certified financial planners, or members
of other licensed professions. The professional conduct of mem-
bers of these professions is generally regulated. The question
here is whether the ethical code of that profession applies when
the regulated person is practicing another profession."'
Again, should their "other" professional codes apply when they act as a
sport agent; or should one particular professional code (e.g., that of a
certified financial planner) be borrowed so as to apply to all those who
act as an agent? That is, until the profession can evolve enough so as to
develop its own personalized code of ethics.24
are of no force and effect in and of themselves. Lawyers are primarily regulated by their state
Supreme Court or State Bar Association which have adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in whole or in part." Id.
22. Dee, supra note 10, at 111.
23. Id. at 112.
24. See generally Linda S. Hanson, The Florida Legislative Revisits the Regulation and
Liability of Sports Agents and Student Athletes, 25 STrTSON L. REv. 1067, 1069 (1996). "Flor-
ida again took the lead by being the first state to require athlete agents to take an examination
testing competency of the laws and rules applicable to athlete agents working in Florida." Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 468.451 (1995). Florida is the first state to attempt to solidify sports agency
as a legitimate profession, complete with requirements, rules and certification examination.
Of course, even it does not provide an ethical code comparable to the legal profession. Flor-
ida is the only state fighting against a history of sleaze or at least perceived sleaze. See also
SLA Spearheads Effort to Make State Agent Regulations Uniform, supra note 1, at 1. The
Sports Lawyers Association (SLA) "announced that a new ad hoc committee has been formed
[Vol. 7:349
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A court has held that an ethical code accompanies attorneys when
they work in another profession, such as financial planning. The case of
In re Dwight" is an Arizona discipline case, where an attorney had acted
as a financial advisor in a transaction for a client. The client subse-
quently alleged that the attorney qua planner had acted improperly and
filed a complaint with the Arizona Bar in an attempt to seek redress.
The attorney, knowing a slight of hand trick when he sees one, at-
tempted to defend in part on the grounds that, at the time of the com-
plaint and while involved in the allegations that formed the basis of the
complaint, he was not practicing law but acting in the capacity of a finan-
cial advisor. Thus, the attorney argued that the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility did not apply. Arizona's Supreme Court did
not buy this argument:
As long as a lawyer is engaged in the practice of law, he is bound
by ethical requirements of that profession, and he may not defend
his actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind
of professional activity. For only this way can full protection be
afforded to the public.26
One writer concurs with this position and feels that it is a natural
segue to relate this view to agent attorneys:
This ruling is both good law and good policy. The fact that a
person is believed to be a member of a profession is certainly a
reason for the selection of the agent by the client. The client's
interests are thus best protected by continuing the obligation of
the profession beyond the scope of the practice. It may also be
argued that the activities of a sports agent or an attorney may be
indistinguishable, for which reason it is appropriate to adopt a
under the auspices of SLA to draft, promulgate, and lobby for the passage in every state of a
uniform agent regulation law. The purpose of this effort is to come up with an effective yet
politically viable statute that would replace the hodgepodge of agent registration/regulation
laws that currently exist in about half the states ... The varied, duplicative, confusing, and
often inconsistent nature of these many statutes creates an enormous burden for legitimate
agents who want to comply with all laws and regulations of the various states and players
associations." Id.
25. 573 P.2d 481 (Ariz. 1977).
26. Id. at 484. A noble view to be sure and one that assures ethical consistency and disal-
lows the attorney from using a professional shell game to avoid his or her ethical responsibili-
ties as an attorney. But what if the attorney is no longer "engaged in the practice of law" per
se, but has his or her career entirely devoted to being a sports agent? This is not at all a rare
phenomenon; and after awhile, one is so consumed by being a sports agent that it becomes
very difficult to continue practicing law. In truth, such an attorney no longer "practices law"
in any meaningful definition of the term. In this situation is it fair that an attorney's "ethical
baggage" follows him like Banquo's ghost no matter how far and permanently he may roam
from the legal muse? Il
1997]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
policy which supports the application of the ethical code regard-
less of form. From the foregoing, it appears the better rule is that
the ethical codes of any regulated profession should apply to the
activities of that professional while acting in the capacity of a
sports agent.27
This is a plausible argument, but athletes are drawn to the track record
of agents, and not their professional affiliations. Does anyone know, or
care, whether Arliss is an attorney or not? No, Arliss is a sports agent!
Also, if the ethical code of each regulated profession accompanied its
licensees into the realm of sports agency, then there could conceivably
be a myriad of different ethical codes gyrating around each agent. (One
code for attorney-agents, a different code for accountant-agents, and yet
another code for planner-agents, etc. A completely different code alto-
gether would apply to "nobody-agents"). If this truly was the case, it
could degenerate into an atmosphere that would breed "forum-shop-
ping" at its worst; "Why should I choose agent X who is an attorney and
must tow the line, when I can choose agent Y who is a nobody and will
bend and break, every rule, with impunity, to get me the very best deal
that we can swindle out of management, who are running dogs any-
how?" Certainly, a distressing scenario.
IV. OHIO DRAWS A LINE IN THE SAND
Ohio is the first state that has attempted to solve this conundrmn by,
in essence, using the argument of In re Dwight for attorneys qua plan-
ners and expanding it to cover attorneys qua sports agents. In Cuyahoga
County Bar Association v. Glenn,2 the Cuyahoga County Bar Associa-
tion of Ohio charged respondent, Everett Glenn, an Ohio-licensed attor-
ney who resided in California, with professional misconduct involving
violations of inter alia, DR 1-102 (A) (1) (violation of a Disciplinary
Rule), 1-102 (A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness
27. Dee, supra note 10, at 113. If the activities of an attorney and agent are indeed indis-
tinguishable, and if an ethical code accompanies an attorney to the new "promised land," then
how would that assist in regulating the ordinary citizen qua agent? If the primary ethical
umbrella available to protect athletes are the penumbras of other professional codes, then
what would save beleaguered jocks from the now emancipated nobodies masquerading as
sports agents? And if the argument is "Oh, don't worry about them, they'll be dealt with by
the unions, the states or the NCAA," then why, if that's the case, subject the attorney-agents,
and accountant-agents, and financial planner-agents to an extra layer of ethical controls, when
in fact, they are no longer in the conceived orbit of the attorney, or accountant, or planner?
They have metamorphisized into something truly different. Id.
28. 649 N.E.2d 1213 (1995).
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to practice law), 9-102 (A)(2) (failure to preserve identity of funds or
property belonging to client), and 9-102 (B)(4) (failure to promptly re-
turn or deliver client's property to client).
A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline of the Supreme Court found that Glenn had violated DR 1-102(A)
(1), (4) and (6) because he requested and retained $20,000 of proceeds
from the renegotiation of certain terms in a NFL standard player's con-
tract between his client, Richard Dent, and the Chicago Bears Football
Club, without his client's consent. Glenn had represented Dent in nego-
tiation for his 1984 contract and had also renegotiated his 1989 contract.
In January 1992, after arranging for his client to be paid the present
value of $200,000 in reporting bonuses anticipated for upcoming years,
Glenn represented to the Bears' treasurer that Dent had authorized his
receipt of $20,000, or 10% of the undiscounted amount. The treasurer,
who had a history of dealing with Glenn, wired this money with the un-
derstanding that he would subsequently return the signed authorization
form faxed to Glenn at the same time of the wire.29
But, Glenn never obtained Dent's signature on the authorization
form; moreover, he did not repay the $20,000 after Dent objected to the
payment. Nor could Glenn explain why he did not immediately forward
the promised authorization form for Dent's signature. Thus, although
Glenn claimed he was owed this money and more for past services and
that Dent had agreed to the payment, the panel credited Dent's testi-
mony that he never authorized Glenn's receipt of the $20,000. The Chi-
cago Bears subsequently refunded to Dent the difference between the
present value of his advanced reporting bonuses and the $20,000 wired
to Glenn.A
The panel also found that Glenn had violated DR 9-102 (A)(2) and
(B)(4) because he negotiated a $10,000 settlement check for damages to
an automobile that Dent allegedly owned. This misconduct occurred
during the approximately three-year period that Dent was a client of the
law firm of Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan and Aronoff. Dent, who
Glenn brought with him as a client to the firm, purchased a Porsche as
president of a company that he had formed with Derrick Crawford and
had apparently guaranteed the loan for the car personally. Crawford
was involved in a collision while driving the car with permission, and his
insurance company wrote a check to Crawford and the Alabama lawyer
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attorney signed the settlement check and forwarded it to Glenn, who
endorsed the check, apparently with Crawford's authorization, and de-
posited it in his own account on December 1, 1990, as payment for pro-
fessional services he claimed to have provided for Crawford. Glenn
further claimed that he told Dent about having accepted the settlement
check as payment for Crawford's fees and that Dent did not object for
over a year, until Glenn pursued arbitration proceedings before the
NFLPA over a fee dispute between them.31
However, Dent considered the settlement check as his, to be applied
to the legal fees he paid for the Alabama attorney to represent Crawford
and to the amount of the car loan. The panel agreed; it again credited
Dent's testimony that Glenn was at first evasive about having received
the check and that Dent only suspected Glenn of having converted to
check when he realized in 1992 that Glenn had paid himself $20,000
from the advanced reporting bonuses.32
After deciding that Glenn was guilty of misconduct, the panel recom-
mended that Glenn receive a one-year suspension from the practice of
law, with the last six months stayed upon the condition that Glenn pro-
vides full restitution to either Dent or the Chicago Bears, as is necessary
to completely reimburse them for the misappropriated funds. The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the panel and agreed
that Glenn violated DR 1-102 (A)(1), (4) and (6), and 9-102 (A)(2) and
(B)(4). But, the Court deemed the panel's recommended sanction to be
insufficient to redress misconduct of this severity; accordingly, the Court
ordered that Glenn be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for
one year. Furthermore, the Court ordered that Glenn may not be
readmitted to the Ohio Bar without proof of having made full restitution
to Dent and the Bears, with interest at the judgment rate; costs taxed to
Glenn.33
V. CONCLUSION
Both the Glenn and Henley decisions appear to give disciplinary
boards the power to discipline attorneys for misconduct that emanates
from the agent-athlete relationship. However, the Glenn case dealt with
very typical forms of attorney misconduct, co-mingling of funds and mis-
representation of a claim, that have been historically adjudged to be a
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1213-14.
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part of the disciplinary board's traditional jurisdiction.34 By combining
Glenn, Henley and Dwight, it appears that most courts would agree that
the Code of Professional Responsibility follows an attorney wherever his
or her career paths may lead.
However, Glenn is an inappropriate scenario in which to build a com-
mon law tabernacle. His misconduct, co-mingling and misrepresenta-
tion, is the preeminent form of ethical violation for attorneys. In Glenn,
his sins had little to do with the unique responsibilities and duties that
are part and parcel of the life of a sports agent.
The conundrum is essentially a product of the nascent stature of the
field of sports agency. It is just a baby still in its infancy and it is only
natural that its bigger and older siblings (law, accounting and financial
planning) would foist their views and morals on the baby of the family.
This is certainly natural, and perhaps even necessary, but there will inev-
itably come a time when that sibling is no longer a child. That baby will
grow and evolve, and develop rules and codes and penalties of its own; a
common law of shared experiences, if you will. This ethical and practical
framework will reflect this profession's uniqueness. Sports agency is not
merely an auxiliary sub-specialty to law, or accounting, or financial plan-
ning. It is a field of its own. It is no more a unit within the legal profes-
sion than portrait painting is to house painting, regardless of the obvious
similarities and comparisons.
Since it is still immature and not fully developed, the field itself is by
definition amorphous and ill-formed. Whereas the legal profession is
thoroughly evolved. The lawyer's code of ethics are absolutely essential
to the very existence of the profession. This ethical code of a well-estab-
lished profession then, may not perfectly fit to the emerging, evolving
and dynamic relationships that are inherent to the sports arena. The
field of sports agency, like boxing management, 35 must ultimately de-
velop its own uniform standards of professional conduct and not attempt
to borrow the ethical codes of semi-related professions.
34. Id. Glenn was a per curiam rote affirmation, except in regard to the severity of the
sentence, of the board's decision. There was no mention of how the court would handle ac-
tions that dealt with misconduct that was anything different from the run-of-the-mill genre of
ethical violations that Glenn committed here. It can be safely culled from the court's apparent
lack of interest and cursory approach to Glenn's status as a sports agent, that the Court would
find no difference between Glenn's duties as an attorney and his duties as an agent. It can be
further theorized that the Court would categorize Glenn's misconduct as DR violations, no
matter how blatantly his actions were agent-oriented. It appears, at least in the mind of this
Court, that the legal profession's ethical rules are more than sufficient to cover the intricacies
of an attorney qua agent.
35. Boxing management itself may be an oxymoron.
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